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ABSTRACT

The district courts of North Carolinaare called to handle a multitude
of legal issues, many of which are vital, personalissues facing individuals
in our society. Court dockets swell with casesfor resolution, due in part to
substance use disorder, addiction, and legal issues thatfrequently arise as
a result of them. The court must adjudicate in the midst of these complex
These litigants are also
challenges experienced by the litigants.
increasingly appearing before the court without legal counsel. In
Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the State
Courts, criticism is leveled at courts that attempt to solve these problems.
Under legislativedirectionand ethical duty, a North Carolinadistrict court
judge may utilize collaborativeandproblem-solving methods to bring cases
to a resolution. These methods, despite the criticism of Frontiers, are not
far beyond the historically contemplatedpurposes of courts and are well
within long-standing structural safeguards, statutory requirements and
ethical obligations. In many instances, the court is called to resolve these
issues and formulate plans for resolution of these cases by the North
CarolinaGeneralAssembly. The challenges thatpresent in court everyday
often need these approved, prescribed problem solving approaches to
answer the needs of the litigants.
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INTRODUCTION

The District Court Division of the General Court of Justice of North
Carolina is a judicial juggernaut that disposes of and resolves disputes
involving a myriad of subject matters, including domestic relations cases,
juvenile cases, traffic infractions, and misdemeanors, along with
preliminary hearings in felony cases and appeals from magistrate decisions.
The caseload can be staggering, and the issues to be decided are diverse.
Depending on the district and court assignment, in a single session, a district
court judge may consider a first appearance on a murder case, a
misdemeanor trial, a domestic violence protective order, an ex-parte
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custody order, and secure and non-secure juvenile custody orders. Nowhere
else in the legal system exists such a broad and diverse jurisdiction. The
sitting judge must balance and consider the multitude of interests present in
these cases and do so with the idea of protecting and preserving due process
at each step. This balancing must be considered during the brief window of
a day of court where much has to be done.
North Carolina District Court judges are guardians of due process
during the balancing just described. Owing to the vast numbers of cases
and individual needs of the litigants, they must respond to these external
forces to engage the greatest number of people with very real, and personal,
These factors, particularly the rising numbers of
legal issues.
self-represented litigants and opioid-addicted litigants, frame the key
inquiry of this Article: within the district court's jurisdiction, what level of
collaboration and problem solving is supportive of overall due process, and
does North Carolina's body of law support collaborative aspects?
Other articles have addressed this key inquiry, albeit in other
jurisdictions. One such article is Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiersof
JudicialActivism in the State Courts1 (Frontiers). In Frontiers,Chancellor
Frank Williams, a Tennessee state court judge, cautions that collaboration
2
and problem solving are tantamount to the demise of due process.
This Article identifies possible answers to the question of what level
of problem solving is supportive of or detrimental to due process in the light
of prior criticism. In Part One, this Article adopts a working definition of
collaboration and problem solving for the purposes of this inquiry. Part
Two identifies the critical, contemporary needs faced by the courts
generally and the North Carolina District Court specifically. Part Three
addresses how the charges in the Frontiers article impact and inform the
analysis of collaboration in North Carolina District Courts. In Part Four,
this Article briefly examines historical implications of the jurisprudential
framework and how those implications inform, or color, the inquiry. Part
Five explores a judge's duties and legislative mandate as a jurist.
In these inquiries, this Article identifies where barriers, or fences, exist
to protect due process and the rights of individuals. This Article also
examines how justiciable issues, and the individuals who experience them,
move from one stage, or gate, to the other, and how those gates are
strategically located to facilitate the resolution of justiciable issues.
Without gates, fences render the areas they protect unusable. Without

1. Frank V. Williams, III, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiersof JudicialActivism

in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591 (2007).
2. See id. at 709-16.
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fences, these areas are open, undefined, and vulnerable. 3 In the judicial
context, fences are the threshold and barrier components of due process that
protect our court processes. Gates, on the other hand, are the pleadings,
enabling statutes, and legislative mandates that direct the court to interact
in a specific and purposeful way with litigants. Judges are the gatekeepers.
To balance competing rights and interests, or the combination of fences and
gates designed by the law, requires problem solving and collaboration in
support of due process. The crux of this Article is that, because historical
practice and the General Assembly have given North Carolina district courts
great latitude in many of society's most important dispositions, district court
judges should exercise that latitude.
I. WORKING DEFINITIONS

Collaboration and problem solving may have a multitude of
generalized or specific meanings, depending on the area of usage; however,
in this inquiry, simple definitions are sufficient in the context of legal
analysis. These definitions are taken from the law and the legal profession's
general understanding of conflict resolution and the settlement of disputes.
Collaboration, in a legal context, is an "interest-based,
settlement-oriented dispute resolution process." 4 This definition notes that
collaboration requires a shared purpose and a common goal among the
parties. 5 In the present analysis, collaboration is limited to the conduct of
legal hearings, with the purpose being a resolution of the problems
enumerated in the complaint or initiating documents. Collaboration is
limited to justiciable issues properly pleaded by the interested parties, and
thus, giving the court jurisdiction. The goals of this collaboration are
largely set by public policy enacted by our legislature and can be discerned
by taking a macro view of our law, as will be discussed in Part Five. The
interests of the parties, for the purpose of the above-defined basis for
collaboration, are the individual rights, desires, and needs of the parties.
The parties themselves are the collective-and unfortunately increasingpopulation of unrepresented and non-legally educated public.

3. See generally Williams, III, supra note 1. This concept is the primary theme of

Chancellor Williams's article and the conclusion that he draws in the article.
4.

See Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law and

the Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30

CAMPBELL

L. REv. 237, 237 (2008).

5. See id. at 243; see also Annelise Riles, From Comparison to Collaboration:
Experiments with a New Scholarly and PoliticalReform, 78 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,

152 (2015) ("[C]ollaboration that has no purpose is nonsense .... [I]f you do not share a
common goal, it must not be collaboration.").
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Problem solving, as a concept in its most basic form, is the pressure a
court has to resolve the issues before it. Courts have a duty to resolve all
issues, that is problems, properly pleaded before it. In fact, a court, and the
judge who presides over it, has an ethical duty to resolve all the issues before
the court.6 In a court context, problem solving can generally be regarded as
the resolution of the contested issues. There is also a more specific aspect
of problem solving: application of discretion within a range of outcomes.
A court often has a range of permitted outcomes that will resolve the issues
before it. Examples of this are how a child custody order schedules periods
of custody with each parent or what a criminal court orders in a probationary
judgment. Both components of problem solving are operational in this
analysis. As judges, we must get the work of the court done, and that
general call to solve problems is inherent in all our court interactions.
However, the more specific law- and policy-driven aspect is where the
district court applies the goals set by the legislature and protects the public.
It is that component that will be more specifically addressed in Part Five.
As stated above, collaboration has an element of a common goal, and
this goal is often to resolve legal issues or causes of those issues. These
moments frequently arise when deciding how to award custody of a minor
child, dealing with a litigant's addiction, or entering a judgment that will
bring about safety for litigants.7 As we will see, the legislature of our state
has answers for some of these situations. It is important to note that some
aspects of these judicial interventions, authorized by statute, are criticized
heavily in Frontiers.
Our district courts serve diverse needs. As outlined above and with
the tools described herein, this service is well within the parameters of
existing due process and far removed from the social engineering foretold
by Frontiers.8

6. See N.C. CODE OF JuD. CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(1) (2006) (amended 2015). The
ethical component of our inquiry is discussed more in Part Five.
7. In many cases before me, I have to craftjudgments that protect the individuals. This
can include a provision requiring a defendant to seek treatment for a drug problem or have
no contact with an individual who is threatened by the defendant. It can also include
providing safety parameters for exchanging minor children in a contentious and volatile child
custody case or implementing a safety plan for a juvenile after disposition. Specific statutory
references to these legislative mandates are set out below.
8. See generally Williams, III, supra note

1.
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II. PRESSING ISSUES WITH THE DUE PROCESS NEEDS OF
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND ADDICTED LITIGANTS

In dealing with voluminous dockets, complex interpersonal
relationships,9 and the ever-changing landscape of litigation, North Carolina
courts must act and react to evolving input factors. One of the ways that
North Carolina courts have changed over the last twenty years is the
increase in the number of self-represented litigants." These individuals
appear before the court without the formal legal training that judges, as
professional participants in the process, easily take for granted. These
self-represented individuals are no different than the litigants seated beside
them who have lawyers. Their causes of action are similar, their desire to
have the court resolve their issues is similar, and their need to have their
cases heard in a judicious way is similar. They, however, are hindered in
most cases by their lack of knowledge of procedure and evidence. They
often have only television or movies to guide them on procedure, a source
that is woefully inadequate to prepare them for the process. This lack of
knowledge can create a huge divide that is difficult to span and treacherous
to manage. These litigants pose special challenges to any judge and are
impaired by their lack of knowledge of how the process works.
Additionally, the rise of opioid abuse and the host of legal issues that
individual abuse leaves in its wake create significant challenges for court
participants. For purposes of this discussion, this Article is not focused on
the litigants who come to court "high."" Instead, the focus is how we-as
judges-can interact with individuals who are severely limited in their
present ability to meaningfully protect their due process rights. The vast
and expansive problem of cognitive and behavioral shortcomings of
addicted individuals 2 worsens when the opioid crisis continues to pose a

9. In North Carolina, the district court has original jurisdiction over juvenile justice
matters and domestic relations (Family Court) issues, in which the personal relationships of
the parties are almost always an integral part of the matters before the court.
10. Or pro se litigants, as they are more commonly referred to by legal participants. See
Jona Goldschmidt, Strategiesfor Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants, 30 N.C. CENT. L.
REV. 130, 130 (2008).
11. Although the existence of people coming to court drunk or "high" points to the depth
and breadth of the addiction problem, my inquiry is limited to how to deal with the cognitive
gap of drug-using individuals and how to resolve the efficacy of litigation with people who
are continually impaired.
12. The science and medical pharmacology impact of controlled substances generally,
and opioids, in particular, is not debated here. The impact of opioid abuse is a topic of
monumental proportions and has been researched, documented, and debated elsewhere. For
the purposes of this Article, I assume the existence of obvious and observable effects we see
in the court system, not their bases, pharmacology, or processes.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss1/4
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significant threat to public health. 3 The real-world implication of this crisis
is that these individuals' lives are in turmoil and often have this turmoil
litigated in court in one form or another.14 The court must preserve the
integrity of its processes while contending with an ever-increasing
population of individuals with serious challenges in their ability to
self-regulate. The judge's challenge is finding balance.
Both above circumstances are daily concerns for trial judges. In
addition to these daily concerns, a host of societal attitudes exist that
increase or diminish the perceived necessity for action. Attitudes similar to
"they got themselves into this mess; let them get out of it" or "a person who
represents themselves has a fool for a client" can exacerbate an already
complicated issue. Simply put, if judges are to preserve the court system's
integrity and efficacy, judges must protect due process, and not neglect
litigants who are "impaired."" In light of the critical importance of the
subject matter, overwhelming number of ability-impaired individuals, and
rising need for access to justice, our courts cannot be dismissive of the need
to address these issues in a thoughtful and grounded way. Our legal
traditions often color the way we look at change. Nowhere is this conflict
more evident than in the court's response to the two groups that are the
subject of this Article's secondary inquiry: self-represented litigants and
opioid-addicted individuals. By looking to the historical and statutory basis,
a court can utilize a more collaborative, and directed, input by the judge to
preserve and promote the due process rights of the public-paying special
attention to the needs of self-represented and addicted litigants that appear
in the courts.

13. According to the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services Division of Public

Health, emergency room visits for opioid overdose through July 2020 remain higher than the
frequency of visits in 2019. See N.C. Injury & Violence Prevention, North Carolina
Emergency Department (ED) Visits for Opioid Overdose: July 2020, N.C. DETECT (Aug. 17,
2020), https://www.injuryfreenc.ncdhhs.gov/DataSurveillance/StatewideOverdoseSurveilla
nceReports/OpioidOverdoseEDVisitsMonthlyReports/StatewideOpioidOverdoseSurveilan

ce-ED-Data-July2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PFU-79B9].
14. This includes, but is not limited to, criminal prosecution for possession, child
welfare or DSS involvement due to the neglect of children, custody and other family-related
issues driven by use, and civil cases such as collections and summary ejectments due to the

financial impact of drug abuse.
15. For purposes of this Article, the term "impaired" will be used in the sense of being
hindered-not by current impairment of mental faculties due to acute drug or alcohol use,
but rather the lack of operative knowledge or present ability to comprehend and meaningfully

participate in the process.
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III. FRONTIERS- COLLABORATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING SIGNAL THE
DEATH OF DUE PROCESS 16

In evaluating the methods judges can employ to preserve the rights of
litigants mentioned above, it is clear that some methods have a collaborative
component. Judges, on occasion, may have to ask questions from the bench.
If the law requires it, judges may have to request further information.
Judges may, during testimony, ask for clarification as to whom a particular
pronoun refers. Facing a large number of cases, a judge may inquire
whether cumulative or corroborative evidence will be introduced. These
inquiries are collaborative in their application. The court is working toward
the goal of arriving at the truth and a viable solution to the litigation.
Lawyers, in the representation of their clients, will usually anticipate and
plan for these eventualities. This dynamic is commonplace, but when a
litigant has no lawyer, there is a vacuum of knowledge. Self-represented
litigants are impaired by what they do not know. A court is therefore
impaired in its proceedings by that void. Thus, a court, in order to do its
job, might intervene. Without cautious interaction, the litigants may be
denied full access to justice under the law. These interactions can happen
with represented litigants but frequently occur with unrepresented
litigants. These interactions frequently draw the ire and consternation of
members of the Bar. 18 Understandably, the power of the court, in tandem
with any discretion in the outcome, makes for a fearsome prospect. Judges,
too, fear the potential of abuse or overreaching by the court, which underlies

16. This is a response to the statements and conclusions raised in Frontiers. See
generally Williams, III, supra note 1. The Chancellor's research and outline of many
contributory factors of judging "actively" are very challenging. In writing this, I completely
abandoned some of my own notions about the topic and changed, significantly, my views in

some regards. This is not an indictment of that work; I highly recommend a full reading of
it. Rather, I am "looking back" and noting the eventual evolution of our law. His views,
coupled with the changes we have seen since the writing of that article, are a study of a
cautious point-of-view that has not, I believe, come to pass. I personally thank the
Chancellor for his words of instruction and caution.
17. Anecdotally, many self-represented litigants who come to court expect the court to
guide them through the process. This is a challenging area of law. The court's ethical duty
to hear cases and preserve each party's right to be heard is discussed in greater detail below.
However, the court's impartiality may be impaired if guidance is given. The resulting need
to balance competing and concurrent duties, placed upon the court, can create great conflict

between the court and the litigants.
18. If the court appears to act in guidance or support of a person without a lawyer, many

attorneys will feel as if the court is favoring that party or, at the very least, providing such
assistance to that party without a lawyer that may discourage the hiring of lawyers for
disputes. In a world where the judge helps the parties, it is perceived that people will forego
the assistance of counsel. This dynamic is prevalent and persistent in many courts.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss1/4
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Chancellor Williams's criticism of collaboration and problem solving in the
Frontiersarticle. 19
In Frontiers,Chancellor Williams describes at great length this thesis:
Collaboration and problem solving violate the tenets of the adversarial
system, resulting in the deterioration of due process of law. 20 He states:

'

If courts in the past properly understood the judicial power to consist of
adversarial proceedings culminating in a judicial decision, then are the
judges of today free to change the meaning of the judicial power by giving
themselves powers and processes never before contemplated by those who
2
framed and ratified the various constitutions?

Frontiers further notes that "judges have become increasingly
powerful social engineers." 2 2 This view is consistent with others that have
challenged the idea that, in an effort to do good, judges, even the
23
In
"best-intentioned judges," can overreach and diminish due process.
summary, the use of the authority of the courts to reach out to the needs of
the litigants is viewed skeptically as the end of due process.2 It appears
that in Frontiers, "due process" is synonymous with the exclusive use of
the adversarial system.25 If we relate the Frontiersarticle to this Article's
key inquiry, we observe the battle between the adversarial system on one
side, and collaboration and problem solving on the other. This conflict
requires analysis of the claims of the Frontiersarticle and evaluation in the
light of adversarial tradition, existing safeguards, and legislative
prerogative. This analysis shows that there is both ample room and support
within due process to allow for grounded collaboration and problem solving
within our adversarial system.

19. See Williams, III, supra note 1, at 709-16.

20. See id. at 593-94.
21. Id. at 594.
22. Id. at 592.
23. Eric J. Miller, EmbracingAddiction: Drug Courtsand the FalsePromiseofJudicial
Interventionism, 65 OHio ST. L.J. 1479, 1575 (2004).
24. Williams, III, supra note 1, at 710-15 (noting the intervention of the "courts which
try to anticipate problems and prevent them threaten the liberty of everyone").

25. See id. at 592, 710-15.
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IV. HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Developing AdversarialTradition as the Exclusive Path to Due Process
As mentioned earlier, Frontiersequates due process to adherence to
the adversarial system. Looking back at our legal system's history, the
foundation of that statement may not be entirely accurate.
The court system in the United States owes the bulk of its form and
process to the courts of England. While being separate for over 200 years,
our courts have developed from a common basis and exhibit some similar
characteristics that evolved independently of one another.2 6 When looking
back at our rich legal heritage, we observe that itinerant courts of the past
were popular and in demand. 27 Therefore, in 1178, King Henry II
authorized the regular seat of court to be at Westminster to allow regular
access to the courts. 28 One legal scholar, George Adams, goes on to relate
that the English courts at that time were varied and had overlapping
authority. 29 It is interesting that Adams notes, "The new court was a
permanent itinerant justice court, held at a central point, in session between
the iters of the justices and accessible to anyone from any part of the
kingdom, if he obtained the necessary permission, that is, the necessary
writ." 3 0 I will come back to this point at a later portion, but for now, it is
sufficient to say that the courts were responsive to the needs and demands
of the kingdom. 3 1 It is worth noting that the courts were an iteration or
embodiment of the sovereign and access to the courts were similar to
seeking divine intervention such as the older trial by ordeal. 32 As time
progressed, the English courts and their procedures evolved to respond to
the changes in the needs of the kingdom. 33 Another legal scholar, Stephan
Landsman, notes that one of the primary aspects of the development of these
courts was the evolution of the adversarial system:

26. See Stephan Landsman, A BriefSurvey of the Development of the Adversary System,

44 OHIo ST. L.J. 713, 739 (1983).
27. See George B. Adams, The Origin of the English Courts of Common Law, 30 YALE

L.J. 798, 800 (1921).
28. See id. at 798.
29. See id. at 802.
30. Id. at 800.
31. See id.
32. See Landsman, supra note 26, at 717-19.
33. See Adams, supra note 27, at 800 (noting that the court's new procedures of writs

and juries "proved popular," and eventually, litigants demanded that the procedures should
be accessible to the public "at all times").
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One way to improve our understanding of the system is by reviewing the
history of its development: this review can assist in identifying the values
the system was intended to serve and the methods by which various
procedures came to be incorporated into that system. Unfortunately, legal
historians have not focused their attention on the development of the
adversary system.3 4

The adversarial system was not the way English courts started out.
Professor Landsman points out that after the rejection of church
involvement in judicial determinations in 1215, the English courts faced a
35
This shift gave
"vacuum" and that "was filled in England by jury trial."
fairness.
preserving
for
method
the
as
rise to the prevalence of the jury
Landsman follows:
Rather than adopt the Roman-canon approach, the English elected to rely
upon the jury. By so doing Britain rejected the straitjacketing evidentiary
rules of the ecclesiastical courts, the active and inquiring judicial officer,
and the use of torture to obtain confessions. The existence of the jury made
England resistant to Roman-canon ideas and thereby opened English courts
at an early date to a broad spectrum of evidence to be assessed by an
increasingly neutral and passive fact finder. The English chose to utilize an
existing form of procedure to meet the needs of society. They thereby
maintained traditional protections and avoided the adoption of a new and,
36
in significant ways, oppressive alternative.

Given this shift to the jury as the fact finder and the rise of the passivity
of the judiciary, a shining jewel of the strict adversarial tradition, we can
identify the historical context that provides the basis for the Frontiers
article's allegations.37 However, this shift is not the sole, determinative
characteristic of due process.
Worldwide, the adversarial system is not the only pathway to justice.
The United Nations has, as a part of insuring efficacy of the rule of law in
38
member nations, adopted the Doha Declaration. In this Declaration, the
United Nations, in the context of criminal justice, seeks to set goals and
34. Landsman, supra note 26, at 714. 1 am not attempting here to define or critique the
adversarial system's history, but only to point out that the adversarial system is only one type
of procedure. In the context of this Article, the adversarial system is equated and elevated
to the solitary vehicle for the preservation of due process and the restraint of tyranny by the

Chancellor's work.
35. Id. at 724.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 714.
38. 13th U.N. Cong. on Crime Prevention & Crim. Just., Doha Declaration on
Integrating Crime Prevention and CriminalJustice, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME 1 (Apr.
12-19, 2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Declaration/V1504151_English.

pdf [https://perma.cc/A8FM-38CD] [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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standards for member nations of due process. 39 Integrated in this
declaration is the recognition of the administration of justice in independent,
sovereign, member nations.40 Justice is to be administered through a
"competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."" The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes in educational materials,
provided to assist university lecturers in the debate and teaching of key
concepts, that "[t]he role of public prosecutors may differ depending on the
legal tradition adopted in a particular country. Two types of legal traditions
dominate the nature of investigation and adjudication around the world:
adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems."" It is worthwhile to note that
the mere existence of multiple legal traditions-both the adversarial and
inquisitorial-point to a lack of exclusivity of either system as the sole
source of "due process."
B. Reaching a More BalancedAnalysis
The adversarial system and its purported demise in favor of more
"active" or collaborative roles of the court 43 are notions that unfairly stage
a binary-optioned battle. By extension of that logic, any procedure that
operates outside traditional notions of adversarial trial makes judges "social
engineers."44 By accepting the premise that the courts must be either
adversarial and traditional4 5 or the instigators of the death of due process,
Frontierslargely ignores the work of legislatures and their sovereign power
to enact laws. While most practitioners of the law will be highly resistant
to many collaborative practices-owing to our biases rooted in adversarial

39. Id. at 2, ¶ 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2, ¶ 5(b).
42. Organized Crime Module 9 Key Issues: Adversarial versus inquisitorial legal

systems, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS &

CRIME

(May 2018), https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/

organized-crime/module-9/key-issues/adversarial-vs-inquisitorial-legal-systems.html

[https://perma.cc/6VWD-9Y85].
43. Chancellor Williams weaves this claim throughout his work and is noted in multiple
instances. For purposes of this Article, "active" would include any collaborative or
problem-solving methods employed by the court. See generally Williams, III, supra note 1.

44. See Williams, III, supra note 1, at 592.
45. Williams points out that courts in the past "properly understood the judicial power
to consist of adversarial proceedings culminating in a judicial decision." Id. at 594. While
this sentence is a part of a larger question posed by the Chancellor, it highlights and reveals
the purposeful framing of the issue. This statement illustrates the binary nature of the
Chancellor's inquiry and the limitations that are a natural consequence. The reader is forced

into an "adversarial or wrong" decision matrix which ignores a multitude of other
possibilities that are not a terminal threat to due process.
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tradition-most legal practitioners would agree the ability of a legislature
to enact laws and implement policies and procedures of the courts is a
constitutionally-protected method of due process. If judges aim to give
litigants all the protection to which they are entitled, i.e., due process, they
must recognize that state legislatures have, by the will of the electorate,
outlined alternate paths to justice. Before elaborating on numerous
statutory provisions later, we must recognize that adversarial trial practices
are not necessarily the exclusive path. It is also interesting to note that the
"good ole days weren't always good and tomorrow ain't as bad as it
seems,"46 and a look at the evolution of court systems does not support the
notion that adversarial process is the only guarantee of justice and due
process.
While Frontiers and many, many members of the various American
Bars share the idea that the adversarial system is a static, exclusive
repository of due process, there are systems of justice that do not use "our"
system. It is myopic, at worst, and presumptuous, at best, to think that other
concepts of due process are without merit. As we further evaluate the
claims of Frontiers, we will see that there are many safeguards to prevent
the woes foretold by the collaboration-critics and, in fact, many instances
where the law requires the collaboration and problem solving of district
court judges.
C. Existing Safe-Guards of Our Systems
As quoted above, Professor Adams points out that in 1178 (prior to the
1215 shift noted herein and by Professor Landsman) the courts were
"popular" and were to be "accessible to anyone from any part of the
kingdom, if he obtained the necessary permission, that is, the necessary
writ."47 Inherent in this statement is the notion ofjusticiability and standing.
Quite a bit hinges on the distinction between these concepts, and the idea is
something very briefly referenced in Frontiers.48
The concepts ofjusticiability and standing predate the Frontiersarticle
by over 800 years and are well settled in the law. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "justiciable" as, "(Of a case or dispute) subject to proper resolution
9
on the merits by a court of justice; capable of being disposed of judicially."a
The concept of justiciability was in place during the formation of the courts
46. BILLY JOEL, Keeping the Faith, on AN INNOCENT MAN (Columbia Records 1984).
47. See Adams, supra note 27, at 800.
48. See Williams, III, supra note 1, at 711 (referencing community court proceedings

dispensing with "the constitutional doctrine of justiciability," as well as the constitutional
doctrines requiring "a case or controversy, standing, and ripeness").

49. Justiciable, BLACK'S LAw

DICTIONARY

(11th

ed.

2019).
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and has continued to the present date.50 This is an important distinction
because the courts lack any authority until invoked with appropriate subject
matter jurisdiction. 51 The North Carolina judicial system has numerous
checks and balances, including standing and justiciability, that preserve the
due process of our courts. As foundational safeguards, which are well over
800 years old,52 these concepts effectively limit the far-ranging activism
described in Frontiers. In all the Chancellor's characterizations and
references to behaviorism, activism, and the sinister work of futurists, a
small but critical notion is largely overlooked-unless people are properly
before the court, the court lacks jurisdiction to remedy the ills of the world
nor can it implement the creation of a "New Man." 3 Without a complaint,
a criminal summons, or a warrant, the courts have no power to affect any of
the "social engineer[ing]" ills Frontierswarns about.54 The conclusions
reached in Frontiershave not been borne out by practice and are largely
ameliorated by internal, limiting thresholds already present in our courts.
D. Caveat: Burdens of Proofand Other Internal Checks Upon Judicial
Over-Reaching
Judicial interaction of any sort with litigants is a contrived function of
duly conferred jurisdiction and discretion. This is a bright-line limitation
on judicial authority. A judge may not neglect the law in favor of his own
personal feelings.55 A judge, similarly, can neither address issues not
pleaded nor adjudicate issues without proper service and notice.5 6
Legislatures control the laws that enable access to the courts, contemplating
collaborative methods at many stages of litigation. 57 Contrary to the notion
of courts intervening in matters prior to the commencement of litigation, 58
collaboration is firmly rooted in the concept that disputes not properly
pleaded are not appropriate for judicial interaction.
50. See generally Adams, supra note 27, at 798 (noting particularly the idea that an
appropriate writ was the key to the court).

51. 1 will note here that there are numerous cases discussing these concepts, notably
State v. Jones, 819 S.E.2d 340 (N.C. 2018). The minutiae of this concept is not necessary
here except to say that North Carolina courts have routinely dismissed cases because of a
lack ofjurisdiction.
52. See Adams, supra note 27, at 798 (discussing the creation of these courts and
safeguards in the 1100s).
53. Williams, III, supra note 1, at 729-30.
54. Id. at 592.
55. N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(1).
56. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 4; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-301-305 (2019).
57. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-190 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-244 (2019).
58. Williams,

III,

supra note

1, at 592.
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V. LEGISLATIVE MANDATE AND JUDGE'S DISCRETION

A. The PracticalBalance-TheFences and Gates to Collaborationand
Solving Problems
When serving the public, judges must find a balance between waiting
and disposition. Judges are forced to manage their dockets to give due
consideration to the matter before them, while not over-indulging in time as
to slight waiting litigants. Inevitably, there will be some waiting in all
courts. But this illustration goes much farther than that base observation.
The American court system generally has had barriers constructed, often
from centuries ago, that are intended to bring order and dignity to our
profession. Judges have dockets to control, making them wrestle with
issues of notice and priority. Judges have procedural rules and laws that
guard the legitimacy and decorum of the tribunals they hold. They have a
multitude of evidentiary rules to guide the truth and veracity of all that they
do. In effect, judges have fences to move and guide them through the quest
for justice. At each stage, well thought-out openings in these barriers exist
in the form of thresholds; these are gates that allow controlled access for the
litigants to step over and into the arena before the Bar. Concepts like burden
of proof, notice, and standing all act as regulated pathways for the access to
justice residing in our courts. These mechanisms, time-honored and
time-proven, serve the purpose of controlling the influx of cases to be heard,
refining the justiciability of those cases, and ensuring the viability of the
process.
B. Judges' Collaborationis Bounded by Legislative Action

'

Looking to the function of a district court, this section will focus on
the more pressing issues of adversarial proceedings and the appropriate role
of the judge. Much has been written about the role of the judge in the
Chancellor Williams points to the common
adversarial system. 59
justification of the "activist" judge is that dockets are overwhelming, and
the needs of the litigants are pervasive. 60 In summarizing his objections, the
Chancellor notes that by assuming the role of social engineers, the courts
throw away due process and become a pathway for modifying behavior. 6
He writes, "Activists have appropriated the lexicon associated with the
59. See Landsman, supra note 26, at 714-15.

In that piece, footnotes 8-10 indicate

some of the discourse in the 1970s and 1980s about the passivity of a judge. See id. at 715
nn.8-10.
60. See Williams,

III, supra note 1, at 725.

61. See id. at 622.
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constitutional judicial system, and have given old words new meaning in a
way that effectively changes the way we think about the role of the courts
and the need for controlling individual and collective life." 62
In continuing this line of thinking, it is noted that "the courts feel free
to redefine the entire community as they see fit, and to take over the task of
creating the kind of people necessary for a just and peaceful future. "63
Further, the Chancellor named legislatures as "accomplices" in the alleged
judicial activism leading to this new society. 64 It is challenging to
adequately address this charge. The accusation that legislatures are
"accomplices" 65 in activism of the courts is a subtle, but pronounced, shift
in definitional, foundational aspects of the Chancellor's article. This
indictment of legislative-mandated change in the court system cuts deeply
and fatally across the Chancellor's work. 66
The American system of government depends entirely on legislative
action, from "We the People"67 to the most recent legislative session. By
taking the proper understanding of judicial determinations68 and setting it
side-by-side with the indictment of legislative action set out above, 69 the
Frontiersarticle exposes its own fatal flaw: legislative changes in the law
have overshadowed traditional views of the courts.
Harkening back to 1178, the courts needed to be accessible to the
people. 7 0 Legislatures embody the will of the people and hold nearly
exclusive authorship of what the law and due process are. Legislatures must
react to changes in society. Clinging to traditional models can hinder access
to courts and, thus, impair the duty of the judiciary. "We the People" are
not only on juries, but we exert our primary influence on policy, procedure,
and change through legislative action. It is difficult to imagine that a court,
acting within its constitutional authority as set out by the North Carolina
General Assembly, is somehow an appropriation of the legal lexicon by

62. Id. at 730.
63. Id. (citing B.F. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 128 (Macmillan Publ'g Co. 1976) (1948)).
64. See id. at 734. This is particularly troubling because the legislature is the Lawgiver

in our democracy and oftentimes constructs the boundaries of due process.
65. Id.
66. I doubt that the Chancellor intended to denigrate the legislative process; I suspect

that naming legislatures as "accomplices" is a commentary on public sentiment and not
legislative action generally. Regardless of the intended meaning, it is the prerogative of a

legislature to enact laws. Our courts, acting within those prescribed guidelines (fences), can
hardly affect the massacre of individual liberty that Frontierscontemplates.
67. U.S. CONST. pmbl.

68. See Williams, III, supra, note 1, at 594.
69. See id. at 734.
70. See Adams, supra note 27, at 800.
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activists. If these same courts are presided over by ethically bound judges,
the safeguards against the ills claimed in Frontiersare further enhanced.
Chancellor Williams states that "legislative and executive branches,
exhausted by the cost of large, regulatory bureaucracies, have found the
courts and private litigation a cost-effective way to regulate most activities
of life and do so in ways that are more acceptable to people." 7 ' In a sense,
72
This
they are accomplices in the expanding role of the courts.
structure
the
rather
but
courts,
the
of
takeover
sinister
a
is
not
arrangement
laid out by the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. Judges, as
noted above, are ethically bound to apply the law as adopted by the North
73
Carolina General Assembly and signed by the Governor. Judges then are
constitutionally restrained by the long-standing concepts mentioned above
and the enabling legislation that drives the courts. This reality is fully able
to address the dangers enumerated. The Frontiers article is a warning
against "activist"74 judges-that argument fails considering the procedural
rules and legislative mandates of today's district court judges.
C. The Reality of the Fields We Work
In evaluating the concerns raised in Frontiers,we must look to the role
that the North Carolina General Assembly has created for a district court
judge. As I stated above, the district court is a court of the people. Handling
the most common and repeated interactions with the court system, the
District Court Division of the General Court of Justice of North Carolina
stands as a primary interface with the general public. According to the
internal statistics compiled by the North Carolina Administrative Office of
the Courts, the district court handles well over two million dispositions per
year (often more than three million).7 5 For comparison, the Superior Court
Division handled just under 300,000 dispositions between July 2018 and
June 2019.76 In addition to the volume of dispositions, the district court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over domestic (family) law cases and
71. Williams, III, supra note 1, at 734.
72. See id.
73. See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2006) (amended 2015).
74. See generally Williams, 111, supra note 1.
75. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Case Load Trends, N.C. JUD. BRANCH, https://
data.nccourts.gov/explore/?sort=modified [https://perma.cc/56T6-PQCF] (compiling totals
by filtering for superior and district court cases and adding all totals together); see also N.C.
Admin. Off. of the Cts., North Carolina JudicialBranch Quick Facts, N.C. JUD. BRANCH
(2018-19),

https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/NC-Judicial-Branch-

Quick-Facts-Card-2018-19.pdfPGYORHO7OvDCmNuOUAzQ7aXkibmjw7f4
[https://perma.cc/B7XY-F5F2] [hereinafter North CarolinaJudicialBranch Quick Facts].
76. See North CarolinaJudicialBranch Quick Facts, supra note 75.
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juvenile cases. The district court also handles traffic infractions and
misdemeanors, magistrate appeals, and first appearances. Acknowledging
the breadth of the district court's jurisdiction, the average person is far more
likely to appear before the district court than any other court in North
Carolina. In these numbers of persons seeking the intervention of the court,
the North Carolina General Assembly has created a framework for the
district court's interaction with the public. By observing our varied
proceedings from a bird's-eye view, we can glean a method that "We the
People," through the North Carolina General Assembly, intend for our
state's courts to work within. With the field of cases properly surveyed, our
courts can act within the scope of their granted authority.
D. Balanced Views of Duty and Discretion
It is thus established that our courts are limited in their reach to cases
properly before the court and are limited to parties that have appropriate
standing. This limited reach stays the court's ability to become the social
77
Legislative mandate further confines a judge's
engineer of Frontiers.
ability to impose an activist will within the segment of the population
properly before the court. Judges must follow substantive, evidentiary, and
procedural laws in addition to the Canons of Judicial Conduct. These salient
fences further blunt the perceived threat of activism brought on by
collaboration and problem solving that Chancellor Williams anticipated.
Viewing the significant and voluminous work done by North Carolina
District Courts every day, there are some places collaboration or judicial
interaction with litigants will not and should not work. For example, in a
case involving child custody, North Carolina courts are strictly controlled
in exercising any jurisdiction by the North Carolina Codification of the
UCCJEA.78 Because Chapter 50A limits the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court, a lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived or cured by agreement of
the parties. 79 Even if all parties agree, the court can have no authority to
hear the case. This limitation on jurisdiction bars some well-intentioned,
otherwise permissible actions. This concrete example cuts deeply across
the notion that courts or "active" jurists can "feel free to redefine the entire
community as they see fit,"80 and exemplifies the further legislative check
on judicial power.

77. See generally Williams, III, supra note 1.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-201-210 (2019).

79. In re H.L.A.D., 646 S.E.2d 425, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 655 S.E.2d 712
(N.C. 2008) (citing In re T.R.P., 636 S.E.2d 787, 793 (N.C. 2006)).
80. Williams, III, supra note 1, at 730.
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Extending this thought further, in cases where there is a salient burden
of proof, such as in a money-owed case absent a valid defense, a court is
bound to act even if it seems unfair. 81 In a contract action for enforcement
of a debt, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving both the existence of
the debt and failure of payment. The defendant also may enjoy affirmative
defenses that are to be pleaded and proved. If a judge were to intervene by
asking questions about the debt, payment, or lack of compliance with the
statute of frauds, these interventions would tend to favor one litigant over
the other and, thus, prejudice the process. Asking a question about payment
or requesting to see an exhibit not provided by the litigants would tend to
further and unfairly tip the scales of justice. These examples illustrate that
a court cannot act independent of the law because it seems like it is the right
thing to do. Additionally, judges are bound by their ethical duty to uphold
83
these laws. 82 Failure to do so can result in discipline or removal.
Moreover, North Carolina District Court judges are elected and responsive
to the electorate. Failure to follow the law can result in the democratic
removal of an errant judge. 84
Conversely, the attitude that the court should simply act as passive
fact-finder is quite contrary to a judge's ethical duty. A judge has
significant and mandatory affirmative duties imposed by ethics,
administrative rules, and other applicable laws. A judge has the ethical duty
85
to ensure the parties have the "full right to be heard according to law."
The court has this duty regardless of the nature of the type of litigants.
Represented or unrepresented, aged or minor, disabled or non-disabled,
English speaker or Limited English Proficiency, the court must preserve the
due process rights of every litigant before it. 86 A court must, "according to
law," uphold the due process of the tribunal and therefore has a
81. 1 have had the misfortune of presiding over money-owed cases where a defendant
admits they owe the money, but they lack any ability to repay. The law is clear that the
plaintiff, in those cases, is entitled to a judgment even if it seems sad or unjust.
82. See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(1).
83. See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
84. See id.
85. N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4) (2006) (amended 2015); see also

Goldschmidt, supra note 10, at 139 (discussing the affirmative, ethical duties of the court,
Goldschmidt's article considers the self-represented litigant, concluding that despite the
status of the litigant, self-represented or represented, the court's obligations to those litigants
do not change).
86. There are significant affirmative duties required of the courts to provide
accommodation of special needs, including language translation, hearing impairment

accommodations, disability access and protection of minors. These multiple instances are
outside the scope of this Article but are mentioned as examples of affirmative duties to
preserve the due process rights of litigants.
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considerable, affirmative duty.8 7 To relegate the court to a passive
participant, with no role to play other than to rule on evidentiary issues, is
to largely ignore the role and purpose of the court. As noted above, the
courts were formed by the sovereign to settle disputes.88 That sovereignty
is echoed in the Code of Judicial Conduct. 89 As the face of the judicial
branch and as a representative of a governed society, the judge has the duties
described above. Placing a judge in the limited role as observer is not only
historically incorrect, but also contrary to the sworn mandate of the judge. 90
With significant fences in place and the court's proper duty
acknowledged, there are many places where the court has latitude to operate
in a more collaborative and problem-solving manner. These gated areas
allow for the court to interact with the millions of people that come before
the district court in a manner commiserate with its legislative mandate. This
mandate is significant and purposeful. As discussed above, the sovereign
directs the courts. In the 1100s it was the King who saw the courts as
necessary, and, in our time, the people, through their legislature, have acted
similarly. Striking the balance between these is the prescribed place that
the district court employs collaboration and problem solving.
E. Boundariesof DiscretionaryAction
In North Carolina and, in particular, in the rural areas that make up
most of the state, fences or the suggestion of fences mark the boundaries of
landowners' properties. Fence lines, hedgerows, field edges, and tree lines
all mark the edges of property. Sometimes, only the shadow of a fence may
remain, but it is obvious where the line should be. In evaluating where the
boundaries are, those parameters can be ascertained by looking at the
overall picture. As such, we can evaluate the parameters of collaboration
in the district court by looking at specific instances where a district court
judge has the power to utilize the statutory guidelines and discretion given
by the North Carolina General Assembly.
F. StatutoryProvisions that Encourage Collaborationand Problem
Solving
The North Carolina General Assembly has given great guidance on
when a judge should implement discretion. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to review all of the case law associated with each of the statutory
87. See Goldschmidt, supra note 10, at 139.
88. See Adams, supra note 27, at 798.
89. See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
90. See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(1).
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references or drill down onto the nuances of each provision. The purpose
of this Article is to evaluate the larger picture of what a court can do and
how that might be implemented with that macro view in mind. Eyeing each
of these provisions gives credence to the notion that it is the job of a district
court judge to formulate workable solutions to engage the general public
who seek out the courts. As the primary tool for access to justice, the district
court is designed to be collaborative in many instances. 91 This mission is
critical in the protection of due process for litigants, especially litigants
encumbered by addiction or lack of representation.
It is important to again take heed of the guarding caution of Chancellor
92
Williams-unbridled discretion and good intentions can do great harm.
Ultimately, it is the judge, guided by the parameters of statutory authority,
who carries out and enforces the process due to the litigants. A judge who
attempts to intentionally depart from these norms will be checked by the
processes currently in place. 93
G. Seeing the Big Picture
Having evaluated the bleak, forward-looking forecast of the Frontiers
article, we should now look to current, actual circumstances. Far from being
"accomplices," our legislature has enacted much legislation that guides a
jurist and practitioner of law. As noted before, the legislature is the
sovereign in our constitution-guided government and is the source of
authority in our government. By examining the conveyed authority and
mandate for collaboration and problem solving, we can ascertain an over-all
mission for the district court.
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 611 is a good place to begin this
analysis. 94 The court, or in our case the district court judge, "shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption

91. See supra Part Five.
92. See discussion supra note 16.

93. The process of accountability by election, the Judicial Standards Commission,
judicial review, peer accountability, cross examination and right to be heard by litigants, and
personal conviction are, from most general to most specific, duplicative safeguards against
gross neglect of duties. Neither this Article nor the Frontiersarticle contemplates the norm
of rouge judges; the Frontiersarticle contemplates judges that are let loose by "accomplice"
legislatures and new norms. See Williams, 111, supra note 1, at 734. This Article does not
address judges that fail to follow their duty, but only seeks to inform those judges who are
intent on doing so.
94. N.C. R. Evi. 611.
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of time,

and

(3)

protect

witnesses

from

harassment

or undue

embarrassment.""
This "reasonable" control is up to the presiding judge to evaluate and
protect the presentation of evidence "effective for the ascertainment of the
truth." 96 Inherent in this method is the ability of the judge to make
moment-by-moment evaluation of the due process as it develops. In this
endeavor the court is mandated to implement "in broad terms the power and
obligation of the judge as developed under common law principles." 9 7 This
is a restatement of the general nomenclature of practice, generally called the
"gatekeeper" function of the court. Thus, the presentation of evidence in a
fair and logical manner, given the individual nuances of each case, is the
duty of the court as developed over time. 98 This concept gives us a basis
for the balance of this inquiry.
The nature of our court is also instructive in the evaluation of our
court's duty. North Carolina General Statute section 7A-190 addresses this
notion. It states, "The district courts shall be deemed always open for the
disposition of matters properly cognizable by them."99 Looking back at our
discussion above relating to standing, notice, and jurisdiction, we see that
this concept is raised here.1 00 This language closely tracks the language
used in the commentary to the formation of the courts at Westminster and
discussed above.' 0 ' Our courts are always open and seated for the dispatch
of business as exigent need arises. However, as a limit on this power, "[A]ll
trials on the merits shall be conducted at trial sessions regularly scheduled
as provided in this Chapter."1 02 This provision of the General Statutes sets
the stage for North Carolina courts to be readily available as needed while
remaining fair and limited by service of process and notice. This concept
was discussed in 1178 in England1 03 and continued until North Carolina
enacted section 7A-190 in 1965. These concepts of court availability are
not new and are far from the vast and sweeping wave of "activism"
mentioned in Frontiers in 2007.104 An indication of this solemn and
95. N.C. R. EvID. 611(a).
96. See id.; see also N.C. R. EvID. 611(a) commentary (2019).
97. N.C. R. EvID. 611(a) commentary.
98. See id. (using the word "obligation").
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-190.
100.

See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.

101. See Landsman, supra note 26, at 729; Adams, supra note 2727, at 800; Williams,
III, supra note 1, at 539.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-190.
103.

See Adams, supra note 27, at 798.

104. Williams, III, supranote 1, at 591. See also Doha Declaration,supranote 3838, at
2 (highlighting modern-day commitment to increasing court availability worldwide);
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constitutionally required task, Chief Justice Mark Martin of the North
Carolina Supreme Court noted the necessity of access in an interview with
Attorney at Law magazine. He said:
Regardless of income or race or any other factor people should have equal
access to the court system. Everyone needs to have confidence that if the
day comes where they have a need to go to the court system that they are
going to find judges who are fair and impartial, they are going to be treated
with respect and they're not going to have economic obstacles to equal

justice.1
There is a significant underlying factor in the former Chief Justice's
remarks that deals with economic barriers to access, but this quote shows
the devotion to court access that is a priority of the North Carolina General
Court of Justice. Bounded by the laws of evidence, foundational mandate,
and stated mission, the courts of North Carolina are designed to be open,
available, and responsive.
H. Specific Provisions Illustratea Pattern
The North Carolina General Statutes are replete with instances where
judges, particularly district court judges, must personify this
responsiveness. Again, divining the limits of each of these provisions in
detail is beyond the scope of this Article because our inquiry is a broad one.
By noting some particularly relevant sections, this portion will illustrate the
component factors of the district court's wide discretion.
It is also important to revisit the limiting notion outlined above
In
concerning these "responsive" and "collaborative" aspects.
adjudications or cases with well-defined burdens of proof, this collaborative
function of the court diminishes significantly, if not completely. North
Carolina District Courts have been given wide discretion in many of
society's most important dispositions both by historic practice and by the
North Carolina General Assembly. The court, in an effort to follow its duty,
must be passive or collaborative as guided by due process as outlined above
and with guidance from statutes. A survey of some statutory provisions will
further highlight these concepts.
Nowhere in the law is the need for collaborative and problem-solving
court action more evident than in juvenile law. The wide discretion and
collaborative nature of many of the code sections cited herein are not the
Adams, supra note 27, at 800 (reinforcing that court availability has been a concern for

centuries).
105. An Exclusive Interview with North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Mark
Martin, Arr'Y AT L. MAO. (May 10, 2017), https://attorneyatlawmagazine.com/chiefjustice-mark-martin [https://perma.cc/KJX8-P5ZV].
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norm at key and critical points-at adjudications in delinquency petitions;
abuse, neglect, and dependency petitions; and in termination of parental
rights petitions. The court has firm and salient burdens of proof with
statutorily defined required fmdings.1 06 At preliminary, dispositional, and
review hearings, the court has a broad mandate. Petitions alleging the
abuse, neglect, and dependency, often called "A/N/D cases," firmly
illustrate the need for court collaboration. North Carolina General Statute
section 7B-502 gives the court authority to enter, ex parte, orders for
children to be taken into custody by the county Department of Social
Services as the needs of the child dictate but uses the word "may" to allow
for flexibility of intervention. 107
Following an adjudication, with the more rigid framework of
adversarial adjudication,108 the court has wide latitude. Section 7B-900
specifically directs that the court should commence "working with the
juvenile and the juvenile's family in their own home so that the appropriate
community resources may be involved in care, supervision, and treatment
according to the needs of the juvenile."'09 The court also "should" work
with community-level services to arrange for the needs of the minor child." 0
Following this mission statement of the court's process, the court is given
wide latitude in making orders to affect the best needs of the child."' The
label of "judicial activism" is not appropriate here. The court is required
under law to make these interventions in a collaborative and
problem-solving manner.
The court has similar authority and discretion in delinquency cases.
Section 7B-2405 and section 7B-2408 mirror the evidentiary and procedural
formalities seen in A/N/D adjudications above and the problem-solving
mode in dispositions contemplated by section 7B-2500 and section

106. In each of these, the full complement of evidentiary rules applies, and the court is
restrained in a very detailed way.

107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-502(a) (2019). Note that this power is bounded by the
requirement that the child occupy the criteria as defined by the North Carolina General
Assembly in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-503 (2019). However, if the child has that status, the
Court is given ex parte authority to quickly act to aid children if necessary but does not
require that action.
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-802, -804 (2019). These statutes note the formality of
representation, the conduct of the hearing, and the application of the rules of evidence.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-900 (2019).
110. Id.
11. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-903-904 (2019). These statutes place a
continued duty on the court to evaluate and review the best interests of the child in deciding

on a dispositive order as set out in section 7B-905. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-905 (2019).
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7B-2506." 2 These dispositions seek to address the needs of juveniles
accused of crimes, and once found delinquent under the more formal
adversarial proceedings, the court "should" formulate appropriate plans to
meet the needs of the child. 1 3 It is evident that the North Carolina General
Assembly recognized and embraced the "proper" role of the district court
in these most pertinent matters, involving the well-being of children, and
mandated this type of collaboration." 4
The district court also handles the range of litigation that is collectively
known as domestic or family law.1 5 By vesting the district court with
original and exclusive jurisdiction over these types of cases, the legislature
has endowed the district court with the mandate to resolve some of the most
important cases the courts (collectively) hear.' 1 ' As stated before, the
district court handles the entire range of juvenile matters, and the district
court is again the tool chosen for cases involving families, children, and
other domestic matters, including domestic violence protective orders.
While there are many stringent statutory parameters for the entry of many
orders," 7 orders relating to custody of children and domestic violence pose
some of the largest challenges to a district courtjudge. A district court judge
shall award custody of a child in a manner that "will best promote the
interest and welfare of the child." 1 8 The court
shall consider all relevant factors including acts of domestic violence
between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either party
from domestic violence by the other party. An order for custody must
include written findings of fact that reflect the consideration of each of these
factors and that support the determination of what is in the best interest of
the child.11'9

In making these determinations, the court, in following this direction
from the legislature, must evaluate all "relevant factors" mentioned

112. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2405, -2408, -2500, -2506 (2019). These statutes track the
same types of processes discussed above in regard to abuse neglect petitions.
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2500. Note that North Carolina has recently amended these
statutes to "raise the age" to 18 from 16 and thus extend this type of dispositional authority
to more juveniles. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1601 (2019).
114. The word "proper" referring back and contrasting with the use of "properly" as used
in the inset. See Williams, III, supra note 1, at 594.

115. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-244 (2019).
116. See id.
117. For example, the factors a court "shall" consider in the award of alimony as set out
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A(b)(1)-(16) (2019).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (2019).
119.

Id.
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above. 2 0 It is up to the court to determine what is "in the best interest of
the child." 1 This concept is a time-honored and venerated tenet of law,
but the emphasis is upon the court to determine the best interests.
Adversarial litigation often fails to adequately present this nebulous
A large problem may arise when litigants who represent
concept.'1 2
themselves fail to understand the court's duty. A brief example will prove
informative and is drawn from this author's own experience. In a case for
the custody of a minor child, two parents are properly before the court upon
appropriate notice, service, and with proper personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction. The pleadings are sparse but adequate. Upon testimony of the
plaintiff, the evidence is summarized: I'm the parent; I want custody, and
we can't agree. The entire testimony of the defendant is summarized as
follows: I'm a parent, we can't agree, and I don't want any custody to be
"just whenever he wants." She also related that there had been a domestic
violence protective order granted in the past. That was all of the testimony.
Under section 50-13.2(a), the court "shall" award custody.' 2 3 It is not an
option to dismiss the case or to send the parties away. The court, in
upholding the ethical duties mentioned previously, must dispose of the
business of the court.124 In this case, the parties properly invoked the
jurisdiction of the court and deserved resolution of the matter.
As this real-world example illustrates, the court is pulled in different
directions, most notably by a judge's ethical duty, the court's statutory
mandate, and the limitations imposed by the litigants' inexperience in court.
The above real-world example is likely a common experience for district
court judges, which makes the conundrum of how to handle these
experiences a pervasive problem. Unless the court delves into some sort of
collaborative measures, this case will not go forward. In this scenario, while
the parties look expectantly to the court for an answer, the court lacks
enough information to follow the statutory mandate, and judicial ethics push
the case toward resolution. The court must find a way to fulfill the due
process owed to these litigants.
In a similar arena, domestic violence protective orders pose
comparable problems. The threshold or burden of production for issuance
of such an order, ex parte, is the subjective fear that acts of domestic
violence will occur or the actual occurrence of such acts.' 25 A court,

120. See id.
121. See id.
122. This concept is well documented in anecdotal experience of district court judges.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a).

124. N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(5) (2006) (amended 2015).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 50B-3(a)

(2019).
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oftentimes with an unrepresented plaintiff and defendant, must figure out
how such an order must be structured. These orders may be sweeping in
their scope and represent a similar ethical and statutory problems as the
child custody illustration given above.
It is apparent from the review of some of the statutory provisions that
a district court judge is likely to see in any given session that the court has
broad discretion and wide mandate from the legislature to resolve the
cases.126 These glimpses are given to inform the reader of the larger scope
of the aims of the district court. The district court not only resolves more
cases, but it resolves some of the most significant cases any court will ever
adjudicate. In dealing with families, juveniles, and their interactions, the
court literally holds the future in front of the Bar and sees a higher instance
of the key populations of self-represented litigants and addicted individuals.
Without a more collaborative approach, time-honored methods of
adjudication, such as strict adversarial proceedings, may utterly fail. The
movement towards alternative paths to due process is not the death of due
process, but rather, the logical evolution of methods to enhance the court's
ability to provide due process.1 27
CONCLUSION

A. Back to Our Key Inquiry-DueProcess and Collaboration
As a final concept for consideration, and ultimately the concept that
demands evolved proceedings, the issues presented by impaired litigants
require another look. It is obvious that the dire predictions of Frontiersand
the underlying biases against collaboration rooted in our adversarial
traditions are not the only factors to consider.1 28 It is established that the
district court is given a mandate and affirmative duty from the legislature
and thus can be collaborative in many circumstances and is directed to be a
problem solver in others.1 29 As mentioned above, litigants who are
impaired, either by their lack of knowledge or by actual chronic impairment,
pose significant and lasting challenges to the courts.

126. See discussion supra Part Five Section H.
127. It is important to note that district courts are required to refer custody cases to
mediation which adopt similar practices of collaboration. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b)

(2019).
128. See generally Williams,

III, supranote 1.
129. Specific examples are the "best interest" considerations in child custody cases and
the required plan formulation from juvenile delinquency dispositions. See discussion supra
Part Five Section H.
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Litigants, faced with court proceedings and unrepresented by a lawyer,
must answer questions of law and evidence in a case that directly affects
them. In a way, they are performing surgery on themselves and being
critiqued while doing so. Strict processes, without accommodation, are
wholly contrary to due process. The court has a duty to provide these
litigants with an opportunity to be heard; this duty is absolute.1 30 By
applying the rules of court, a judge might demand from the litigant
information or knowledge that they do not possess. In doing so, the court
may cut off the due process rights of the litigant. More significantly, the
court may severely undercut its ethical duty to maintain the court's
integrity 31 and preserve the public's confidence in the courts. 13 2 In contrast,
when a judge goes too far and aids a litigant, the judge violates Canon 3 by
failing to maintain impartiality.13 3 These ethical duties override any
unpopular notions of pandering to unrepresented litigants or fearing
disapproval. 134 The question is not one of a particular practice or a method
of treating one group in a particular, prescribed manner. Most courts handle
cases in the way they have traditionally handled them, without a great deal
of introspection. The real issue is a manifest dedication to fairly dispose of
all cases for all types of litigants.
As a further consideration, litigants struggling with addiction create
great challenges to the duties mentioned above. In an A/N/D case, the court
has wide authority to intervene by ordering treatment.1 3 5 A district court
judge can order treatment as part of a criminal judgment. 136 These courts
were also added to the range of options available for probation conditions.13
Therapeutic and problem-solving courts have been created nationwide and
are maintained as vehicles for the accommodation for special challenges
posed by chronic addiction. North Carolina recognized the value of these
courts and enabled the creation of Drug Treatment Courts.1 38 These
enabling pieces of legislation indicate a firm commitment by the North

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(4).
See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (2006) (amended 2015).
See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (2006) (amended 2015).

See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2006) (amended 2015).
See N.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(1).

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-904.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2019).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(bl)(2b). Criminal dispositions benefit from

collaboration and problem-solving aspects as well, owing to the requirements set out in the
statute.
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-793, -796 (2019) (establishing management committees
to determine how local drug treatment courts will operate).
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Carolina General Assembly to create courts that are responsive to the
increased needs of individuals stricken with addiction.
In viewing these particular examples, we obtain clarity in the mission
of district courts in particular. By giving these courts great discretion and
ability to be responsive to societal issues that confront the public, the North
Carolina General Assembly has attempted to benefit the people of the State
of North Carolina. Legislatures are not "accomplices"' 39 in some grand
social engineering experiment; rather, they are fulfilling the stewardship
entrusted to them by the people of their states. The courts are not
re-engineering our society; the courts are carrying out their mission and
applying the laws made by the North Carolina General Assembly. We
return to this point: legislatures are not accomplices; they represent the
sovereigns in our system of government. In that capacity, the North
Carolina General Assembly has given our courts great authority to respond
and adapt to our changing society.
B. FinalPerspectives and Thoughts
In trying to glean an overview of how courts may act, we have to look
at how they have acted and how they have been directed to act. Connecting
the dots in our overview is instructive and illustrative; the reader observes
individual vignettes of authority and mandate that make up the larger
tapestry of our courts' processes. Nothing in this Article is intended as a
"should act" statement. If day-to-day functioning and idiosyncrasies of
courts are examined, even seasoned jurists fail to provide a comprehensive
answer. I therefore decided to embark on this project to inform myself, and
ultimately the reader, of some aspects that I considered. There are many
other aspects, but my method of inquiry was to look back to where we
started. Being thus rooted in our past, I extended the inquiry to connect to
what we see today. This progression is bound to and supported by
individual threads of authority given by our legislature. My observations
and analysis are limited to the field directly in front of me. My intent was
to prompt my colleagues on the bench to consider their own jurisprudence
and ethical duties to arrive at an answer that they can implement in their
courtrooms.

Individual jurisprudence, that is, the rich tapestry of education and
experiences that each judge brings to the bench, is similar to the diversity
and variation in experience that trial lawyers ardently seek in their juries. A
diverse background of judicial experience that broadens the trial judge's
temperament is not unlike the multiple perspectives that a jury melds into

139. See Williams,

II, supra note 1, at 734.
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one decision-making body. The combination of training, experience, and
wisdom of a judge occurs internally and not in a group setting, as in a jury.
Judges should draw from their experiences as an attorney and have those
experiences act as a lens through which they see the world and the evidence
presented. With this concept in mind, I state the obvious-each judge is
different. In the same way that we would not want uniformity of gender,
race, vocation, and experience in a jury, jurists are and should be diverse.
This Article begins with one judge commenting on the well-researched
hypothesis of another judge in Frontiers. This response highlights that each
judge must evaluate his or her own jurisprudence and render justice
accordingly. This is not only a reality, but a necessity in our system. I am
offering to any jurist who may read this Article a starting place or a set of
building blocks. These concepts can be used to begin an internal,
self-evaluation of beliefs to be exercised in their sound discretion. To the
practitioner, who views the bench from an entirely different perspective, I
offer some insight into the highwire balancing act that a trial judge performs
daily and some markers to enlighten the evaluation of a judge's decisions.
Engaging in that self-evaluation, judges and practitioners of law can take
their given place in our system of government that was intended, as far back
as medieval England, to respond to the public. Failing to respond to the
needs of our self-represented litigants, our addicted individuals, and our
evolving society will certainly limit our effectiveness as an equal branch of
government.
In determining the level of collaboration and problem solving that is
appropriate in a district court and thereby answering the key issue of this
Article, we have responded to the charge that such processes are dangerous
and fatal to due process. We certainly are not the "social engineers" that
bring the death of due process, as Chancellor Williams suggests. In
actuality, the district court is the place people in need come to resolve their
most poignant and private disputes, and our legislature has recognized this
by codifying many collaborative and problem-solving mechanisms. The
reality of our daily judicial process is that some segments of litigants,
self-represented litigants and addicted individuals, pose additional
challenges to our balancing act of due process and ethical duty.
Each judge may ethically and lawfully employ the guidance given by
the legislature in adopting collaborative and problem-solving practices.
Each judge must formulate the level of such practices, based on sound
discretion, to fit each individual circumstance. Ultimately, the district court,
through its diverse judges, will employ these methods to ensure we maintain
our responsiveness to the needs of the litigants. We must guide the public
through the gates and mind our salient fences if we are to uphold our ethical
duty. We must be worthy of the trust of the public to retain the integrity of
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our equal branch of government. Never forgetting the solemn duty that we
have sworn to uphold, the stern and sincere warnings of Frontiers and
related writings, our rich legal traditions, and our ample legislative
guidance, our courts can meet the dynamic needs of the all the people we
serve with the use of collaborative methods and problem-solving practices.
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